on :
Monday, 7 Jan, 2013
Iran’s Broadcasting Feud
blog: SAFFRON
Tehran’s media machine
is pulling out all the stops to broadcast beyond Iran’s borders, mainly
succeeding in upsetting regional competitors and neglecting a domestic
audience.
Former
Speaker of the Iranian Parliament and reformist presidential candidate
Mehdi Karroubi (L) and Iranian hardline President and presidential
candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (R) prepare for their live debate on state
TV in Tehran in 2009.
Twenty years ago—when I was only seven years old—Iranian television
broadcasting was limited to two channels. I remember well how one of the
channels used to broadcast an Arabic program for an hour every Friday
afternoon. Images of the Palestinian Intifada accompanied by mournful
music make up a vivid part of my childhood memories.
Over recent years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has increasingly
tried to expand its international broadcasting. That one-hour program
twenty years ago has now been developed into a number of separate,
costly television channels, including round-the-clock news networks,
religious channels, film broadcasting, and so on.
Iran’s leaders have consistently accused foreign media of a so-called
‘cultural invasion’: a broadcasting campaign set to undermine the
authority and legitimacy of Iran’s government. Amid the post-election
protests in 2009, the government laid the blame on satellite television
channels, accusing them of conspiring to spark protests in the streets
of Iran. This view has not always been limited to the Islamic
establishment; the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was
convinced that the BBC’s Persian Service played a critical role in the
Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the ultimate fall of the Pahlavi regime.
The Iranian authorities have tried tirelessly to wean the Iranian
public off their steady diet of foreign media. This has been achieved to
a certain extent by passing preventive regulations and penalties on
foreign media on the one hand, while launching costly international
broadcasting for ‘safeguarding the truth of Islam and defending the
ideals of the regime, Imam [Khomeini] and the Revolution.’ However, the
expansion of Tehran’s international broadcasting empire has overall met
with limited success and has ruffled feathers amongst Iran’s regional
neighbors.
In November 1997, the leaders of the Islamic Republic decided to
launch new TV channels to propagate their Islamic views and broadcast
the self-professed ‘voice of the revolution’. These satellite TV
channels started their work under the name
Sahar, literally
meaning “dawn”; programs were broadcast in Russian, Turkish, Urdu,
Arabic, Azeri, French, Bosnian, and Kurdish. All of these continue
operating and expanding their broadcasts, except those aired in Russian
and Turkish.
The most prominent of these networks has been Sahar Arabic TV, the
channel that caused an outspoken reaction from the French government
after it broadcast a low-quality but controversial movie called
The Blue Eyes of Zahra.
The movie was severely censured by the French authorities for being
anti-Semitic, accusing the channel of denying the Holocaust. After this
incident, Sahar Arabic TV was replaced by Al-Kawthar channel, a
Tehran-based, 24-hour Arabic-language television network. The channel
aims to strengthen and expand Shi’a doctrine across the Middle East, and
to bring Arab Shi’ites closer to the Shi’a government of Iran.
According to the producers of the channel, most of their viewers are
Iraqi and Lebanese Shi’ites.
Another controversial channel belonging to the Sahar Universal
Network is Sahar Azeri TV, which has caused mounting tensions in
relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. Both countries’ populations are
predominantly Shi’ite; however, in the former country power lies
unequivocally in the hands of clerics, while in the latter the
leadership is fiercely opposed to religious governance. This fundamental
difference between Iran and Azerbaijan has repeatedly elicited a
negative reaction from Baku’s secular government, accusing Tehran of
interfering with its internal affairs and pursuing their expansion of
Islamism via their TV broadcasts in the Azeri language.
In December 2012, several senior employees of Sahar TV were arrested
in Baku Airport. The reporters were detained on several charges,
including drug trafficking. Ali Huseynov, the head of the
socio-political department of the Azerbaijani Presidential
Administration, visited Tehran and asked Iranian officials to halt Sahar
TV broadcasts. On his return to Azerbaijan, local media quoted him
saying, “I candidly and openly told Iranians that the Azerbaijan
government is secular and following the path to modernity. Instead, the
Iranian government is Islamist and ideological and is following its own
way. You go your way and we go ours.”
Hoseynov also threatened to set up Shab TV, to be broadcast in Iran
in retaliation for Sahar. Iran is evidently ignoring Azerbaijan’s
threats. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) recently
announced it will be increasing the working hours of Sahar Azeri TV from
nine to twenty-four hours. The same plan is on the agenda for the
French, Kurdish, and Urdu channels.
Iran’s broadcasting tensions with neighboring countries are not
restricted to Sahar TV. Since the emergence of the Arab Spring, Iranian
TV channels have come under attack from Gulf monarchies, especially in
Bahrain. The Bahraini authorities have continually blamed Al-Alam TV for
provoking unrest in the island kingdom.
Al-Alam is a Tehran-based, Arabic-language television network that
began its work at the start of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. From its
birth, it was evident that the main target audience was Iraq’s Shi’ite
population. Although Al-Alam lags far behind Al-Jazeera and Saudi
Arabia’s Al-Arabiya in terms of popularity and penetration, it has been
influential among the Shi’ite populations of Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen.
The most significant confrontation between Iranian media and those of
Persian Gulf neighboring countries has been over the crisis in Syria.
Al-Alam sided with Damascus-based television channels and Hezbollah’s
Al-Manar in defending Assad’s government—and in doing so, confronting
almost every other major Arab TV channel.
The controversial Al-Mayadeen TV channel was born out of the media
dispute between those Arabic-language channels supporting the Assad
government and those opposing it. Several prominent reporters left
Al-Jazeera and set up Al-Mayadeen to counteract the influence of what
they perceived to be Al-Jazeera’s anti-Assad agenda. Many believe that
Al-Mayadeen is sponsored by Iran, and its overall views are affiliated
with Iran’s interests in the region.
In 2007, Iran launched its 24-hour English-language television
channel Press TV, with the aim of breaking the monopoly of Western
media. This was Iran’s first serious attempt at entering the arena of
Western media. It has thus far failed in this mission, unable to breach
the popularity of regional rival Al-Jazeera and certainly unable to
compete with the quality of Western media. Ideological restrictions are
mainly responsible for having stifled the channel’s development. Those
that do watch Press TV are drawn from the Muslim minorities in Western
countries such as the UK.
Tehran’s Spanish attempt has been equally futile. Hispan TV, the
latest international 24-hour news channel launched by Iran, mainly
targets South American countries. These countries have little in common
with Iranian ideology beyond a general anti-American orientation. The
channel appears to be totally out of touch with its target audience,
mainly airing low-budget Iranian shows dubbed into Spanish and religious
documentaries.
Regardless of the quality of Iran’s global media, Tehran’s
vulnerability lies in its disproportionate investment in international
broadcasting, neglecting the audience at home. The poor quality of local
channels recruits the Iranian audience to Persian-language satellite
channels. This trend is unlikely to slow down any time soon as
international sanctions strangle the IRIB, now on the verge of
bankruptcy. Iranian officials have made costly mistakes in prioritizing
their target audience. Instead of focusing their efforts on the domestic
audience, they are trying to win over viewers abroad. In dealing with
the needs of their own citizens, Iranian officials have so far excelled
in jamming satellite signals and prohibiting the ownership of satellite
dishes, while monopolizing the running of any kind of TV or radio
station.
Farahmand
Alipour was the special correspondent to Mehdi Karroubi, one of the
four presidential candidates in Iran’s 2009 elections. He is a graduate
of Journalism with a major in Strategic Reporting from the School of
Media, Tehran. Alipour now lives and studies in Italy, reading
International Relations at Turin University.